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ory has failed is precisely because courts have been too prag-
matic, too unprincipled, too ad hoc, and too majoritarian. 
Professor Smith does not address many of the questions left 
burning at the end of Foreordained Failure. He fails to say how 
he would resolve the interpretive problems created by his histori-
cal argument, and he elects to give only a brief discussion of the 
practical implications of his theoretical argument. Yet these are 
not tragic flaws in his effort. Smith's historical argument is 
powerfully presented, and he makes a valuable effort "to clarify 
our situation by trying to explore the nature and sources of our 
current confusion." (p. 121) Although Smith is wrong to suggest 
that the elusive nature of "neutrality" renders the process of the-
orizing about religious liberty hopeless, he nicely ferrets out and 
critiques the background assumptions that inform modem theo-
ries of religious freedom. His book is insightful, original, and 
foreordained to succeed. 
JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION. Edited by Warren F. 
Schwartz.! New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995. 
Pp. 246. Cloth, $49.95. 
Hiroshi Motomuraz 
Immigration law reduces to a few basic but difficult ques-
tions. Should we restrict entry by outsiders? If so, what princi-
ples guide those restrictions? And after a newcomer arrives, 
when is she no longer a "newcomer," but one of "us"? These 
three questions are deceptively simple when so phrased, but they 
are the core issues of law and policy. We should keep them in 
sharp focus, the mind-numbing complexity of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act notwithstanding. 
We can answer these questions from different perspectives. 
One perspective involves policymaking through legislative and 
administrative processes. This is, of course, the staple diet of the 
Senate and House immigration subcommittees, as well as the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review, and other administrative bodies. Our three 
basic questions inform decisionmaking at this level, but inevita-
1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
2. Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder. I would 
like to thank Linda Bosniak and Carol Lehman for their thoughtful comments on earlier 
drafts, and Hans-Joachirn Cremer for guidance on matters of German law. 
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blythe process consists of reactions seriatim to immediate polit-
ical pressures and concerns. A thousand architects and a 
thousand carpenters have built the house of immigration law. 
Where, then, do those who make immigration policy 
through legislative and executive processes find the basic princi-
ples and norms that guide them and sometimes limit their 
choices? The Constitution is the answer in many areas of Ameri-
can law. But in immigration law, the Constitution's ability to 
play this role is limited by the plenary power doctrine, which se-
verely restricts judicial challenges to immigration decisions by 
the government. 
One of the unfortunate consequences of the plenary power 
doctrine is the absence of a dialogue between the judiciary and 
the political branches based on a mature body of constitutional 
doctrine that sets out the fundamental values and the outer 
boundaries of immigration law and policy. True, the plenary 
power doctrine has undergone significant erosion over the past 
half-century. The Supreme Court has recognized a "limited judi-
cial responsibility" to exercise constitutional judicial review in 
immigration cases.J On another occasion, the Court suggested 
that an immigration decision by the political branches must have 
a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason," or else it cannot 
withstand constitutional judicial review.4 Some courts have exer-
cised this limited scrutiny to strike down immigration decisions 
as unconstitutional.s Some courts have developed a procedural 
due process exception to the plenary power doctrine.6 And other 
courts, while not striking down statutes as unconstitutional, have 
interpreted them to reach the same outcome.7 In spite of all of 
this, the erosion of plenary power has not resulted in a coherent 
body of constitutional principles.s Constitutional norms play a 
role in advocacy, but it is very hard to predict when courts will be 
persuaded. 
3. See Fial/o v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977). Cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 
342 u.s. 580, 591 (1952). 
4. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 
5. See, e.g., Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1994); Francis v. 
INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976). 
6. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625 (1992). 
7. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545 (1990). 
8. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immi-
gration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hast. Const. L.Q. 925 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, The 
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1984). 
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We need a constitutional compass, not only for policymakers 
in the legislative and executive branches, but also for judges 
when they interpret and apply immigration statutes. And those 
who would fashion that constitutional compass for these policy-
makers and judges need an even more basic sense of direction as 
they consider the fundamental questions of immigration law. 
This is the context for the significant contribution made by 
Justice in Immigration, a collection of essays edited by Professor 
Warren F. Schwartz. As the title suggests, the authors use the 
language of justice and welfare to engage in a conversation about 
immigration law and policy. Is it ever "just" for borders to keep 
people out? If so, then when? Does immigration promote "wel-
fare"? Whose welfare? 
I 
Joseph Carens opens the book with an essay that not only 
introduces the other contributions but also deftly captures many 
of the tough issues for today's immigration policymaker. He 
groups issues under three separate but interconnected headings: 
"special claims," culture, and economics. By "a special claim," 
Carens means "a distinctive and compelling moral claim to ad-
mission." (p. 4) His point that refugees and families both have 
special claims makes sense, gently correcting the many policy-
makers who would not readily see the link. Moving to the sec-
ond set of issues, Carens asks whether it is permissible to take 
culture into account in the initial selection of immigrants. And if 
so, how? And after initial admission, what degree of cultural ad-
aptation may the receiving society legitimately expect of immi-
grants? As for the third issue-economics-to what extent 
should the economic interests of the receiving society guide its 
immigration policy? Even assuming that economic considera-
tions should guide policy, how should we weigh the economic in-
terests of different groups within the receiving society? And 
what about the economic terms of admission? What social enti-
tlements should we provide newcomers? Carens conveys the 
treacherous complexity of these questions while providing a clear 
roadmap for the other authors' answers to these questions, in-
cluding a brief but accurate summary of the other ten essays. 
A collection of essays by eleven different authors hardly 
lends itself to detailed review in a few pages, and specific criti-
cism of the views in the book is available in the book itself, as 
many of the essays respond to others. Rather, the focus here is 
not on their specific theses, but on their common ground in ori-
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entation and method. For many readers of a journal called Con-
stitutional Commentary, the most intriguing aspect of this book 
will be its relationship with the constitutional aspects of immigra-
tion law. Precisely because the application of constitutional prin-
ciples to immigration cases is so unclear, a parallel (or anterior) 
inquiry in the language of justice and welfare has great promise. 
Much of the book asks whether and how fundamental prin-
ciples of liberal democracy place outer limits on the content of 
immigration law and policy. As Michael Trebilcock puts it in his 
essay: "How does one define and justify the conditions of mem-
bership in the community?" (p. 219) In his words, immigration 
policy debates in "all Western democracies" center around "two 
core values that stand to some irreducible degree in opposition to 
each other: liberty and community." (p. 220) 
Individual autonomy is a core value in a liberal democracy, 
but immigration laws restrict the free movement of individuals if 
they are outsiders or nonmembers. Yet, are limits on immigra-
tion necessary to maintain other essential aspects of a liberal de-
mocracy? What, for example, is the role of immigration in the 
construction of community? And to what degree is the construc-
tion of community essential to the individual autonomy of those 
who, as members, engage in that enterprise? 
Individual autonomy in one form-through freedom of 
movement-thus stands in tension with individual autonomy in 
another form-through restrictions on the movement of others, 
which may be necessary to construct communities within which 
to pursue liberal democratic goals. This tension prompts many of 
the authors in this collection to search for principles of justice to 
help resolve this tension, and even more fundamentally, to ask 
whether there can be a resolution at all. As Jules Coleman and 
Sarah Harding put the question in their contribution: "Are immi-
gration policies the sorts of things that fall within the ambit of 
distributive justice?" (p. 39) 
Or instead, must we think of distributive justice as applying 
to communities, and not across the borders of communities? In 
other words, is "membership" in a community anterior to 
"rights" recognized by a community? Or does every human be-
ing have some justice-based claim to become a member? Most of 
these authors seem to believe that we owe more membership-
based obligations to those who are somehow "closer" to us. But 
these authors vary on exactly how we should meet those obliga-
tions, and in turn on what immigration restrictions are morally 
permissible under principles of justice. 
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These authors include some of the nation's most distin-
guished and prolific scholars in law, philosophy, and economics. 
Interestingly, many of them have little background in immigra-
tion law and policy. (Joseph Carens is a notable exception.) This 
combination of erudition and innocence is the source of many of 
the book's virtues-and a few vices. 
First, a brief but necessary word about the vices. Several 
essays get the law wrong in places. A sampling would include: 
that family-based immigration is not numerically limited (p. 47) 
(true for parents, spouses, and minor children of citizens, but 
false for other relatives of citizens and for all relatives of perma-
nent residents )9; that alienage is a suspect classification (p. 179) 
(since the Supreme Court announced that principle in Graham v. 
Richardson,w it has declined to apply it in a number of cases, 
notably Mathews v. Diaz);u that ethnic Germans around the 
world have "a right to claim citizenship" (pp. 21, 31) (German 
citizenship requires more than mere German ethnicity);tz and 
that Germany permits asylum applicants to work pending a deci-
sion (p. 24) (as a rule, they may not).l3 
There are a few other curious passages. The use of the term 
"legalized aliens" to refer to permanent residents (p. 22) is con-
fusing, since "legalized aliens" are previously undocumented 
aliens who acquired lawful status under the amnesty provisions 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.14 It is not 
quite right to say that citizenship is "essential to vote in any elec-
tion in the United States and Canada." (p. 27) A few American 
localities permit noncitizen voting. While these are isolated ex-
ceptions, they have figured prominently in discussions of alien 
suffrage.ts Statements about the rarity of naturalization in Ger-
many (p. 32) overlook recent government initiatives to ease the 
legal requirements. And one account of the history of American 
9. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201-203 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-
1153). 
10. 403 u.s. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
11. 426 u.s. 67, 78-80 (1971). 
12. See Bundesvertriebenengesetz § 6(1); Hans Alexy, Rechtsfragen des Aus-
siedlerzuzugs, 1989 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2850. 
13. Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung § 5; Arbeitsfi:irderungsgesetz § 19(4). 
14. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 
3394 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a). 
15. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, 
and Fundamental Law 10 (Princeton U. Press, 1996); Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the 
People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 259, 292-
300 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional 
and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1391, 1460-61 (1993). 
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immigration law (p. 152) disregards important research on the 
extensive body of state immigration regulation before 1875.16 
These are more than mere quibbles. They undermine the 
confidence of the informed and experienced reader. However, 
from a purely analytical standpoint, these passages never under-
mine the author's basic point. At a more fundamental level, 
these essays are full of the illuminating, the perceptive, and the 
provocative. What is interesting-and this is the reason to raise 
these concerns-is that the book is often illuminating, percep-
tive, and provocative precisely because the authors seem unen-
cumbered by conventional wisdom, or by the details of doctrine, 
for that matter. 
II 
A. DEFINING IMMIGRATION LAW 
This collection makes significant contributions on several 
questions that have important parallels in constitutional immi-
gration law. One question is quite basic: what is "immigration 
law"? The traditional definition includes admitting noncitizens 
into the United States and allowing them to remain. Until the 
recent changes in the 1996 immigration reform legislation, this 
meant "admission," "exclusion," and "deportation." Now the 
terminology is "admission," "inadmissibility," and "removal."I7 
Thus, "immigration law" proper does not include aliens' rights 
and responsibilities once they are in the United States; such 
"nonimmigration" questions belong to a distinct body of "alien-
age" law. The line between immigration law and alienage law is 
important-above all because courts typically apply the plenary 
power doctrine to limit judicial review of "immigration" but not 
"alienage" matters. One of the fundamental conceptual 
problems for immigration law scholarship is this elusive but piv-
otal line between immigration law and alienage law.ts 
Mark Tushnet defines immigration policy to include not only 
immigration proper, but also the integration of migrants into the 
receiving society, i.e., questions on the alienage side. (p. 147) 
Treating immigration and alienage together is key to Tushnet's 
16. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 
Colum. L. Rev. 1833 (1993). 
17. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
§ 304, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. 
18. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That 
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047 (1994); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and 
Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 201, 203 (1994). 
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ultimate conclusion: that immigration restrictions are generally 
inconsistent with principles of liberal democracy. Jean Hampton 
and Alan Sykes work with similar definitions. (pp. 89, 183-84) 
James Buchanan likewise focuses on problems of integration, 
particularly the problem that immigrants, even if they have no 
net economic impact, may undermine the social and political or-
der if they are allowed immediate and direct political participa-
tion. (p. 65) Louis Michael Seidman takes an equally broad view 
of "immigration" when he contrasts Plyler v. Doei9 with the ab-
sence of judicial review for deportation decisions. Seidman asks: 
"How can it be that it is constitutional to deport them, thereby 
depriving them of both a U.S. education and physical presence, 
but that it violates their constitutional rights to deprive them of a 
U.S. education without depriving them of physical presence?" 
(p. 142) 
These authors may be right to look beyond the separation 
between immigration law and alienage law, and to adopt this 
broader definition of immigration law and policy without express 
defense or elaboration. Indeed, I share the view that we need to 
integrate immigration and alienage law into a larger body of con-
stitutional principles governing membership. Yet, the informed 
reader may wonder why these authors do not pause to mention 
the considerable debate about this definition. Prominently, 
Michael Walzer has provided a seminal, highly textured account 
of the relationship between immigration and alienage issues. 
Much of his treatment suggests that any efforts to integrate immi-
gration and alienage law must consider some key differences be-
tween them.zo 
B. PERMISSIBLE LIMITS ON IMMIGRATION 
The book also contributes by addressing a second basic 
question with important parallels in constitutional immigration 
law: what, if any, limits on immigration are permissible in a lib-
eral democracy? Jules Coleman and Sarah Harding explore the 
tension between liberal democracy and immigration restrictions 
by surveying the laws of several Western liberal democracies. 
They evaluate these laws by asking what conception of justice 
would justify them, and that analysis leads them to question the 
legitimacy of states and borders. Jean Hampton discusses non-
consensual, ethnicity-based or race-based conceptions of mem-
19. 457 u.s. 202 (1982). 
20. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 52-61 
(Basic Books, 1983). See also Bosniak, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1068-87 (cited in note 18). 
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bership-such as in Germany and Japan-to illustrate the sort of 
immigration restrictions that are incompatible with liberal de-
mocracy. After examining the contrast with a "consensual" 
model, her evaluation of the nonconsensual model leads her to 
question the "legitimacy of the nation-state." (p. 78) Hampton 
"reject[ s] most citizenship policies driven by a strong sense of na-
tionalist identity." (p. 68) 
Stephen Perry discusses how a liberal democracy can strike a 
coherent balance between universal and localized obligations. 
He concludes that the obligations of liberal states toward outsid-
ers (especially refugees) are more extensive than usually recog-
nized in practice, but that these universal obligations do not 
negate additional and greater localized obligations. (p. 105) Re-
ceiving societies should have some discretion as to the numbers 
of immigrants admitted, and immigration restrictions are not 
"fundamentally illiberal" per se. But Perry argues that some re-
strictions are impermissible. (p. 105) A liberal democracy may 
not exclude on cultural grounds; by way of exception, however, 
culturally based admission criteria may be used for refugees only. 
(pp. 110-24) In contrast, Seidman doubts that the fundamental 
tension between universal and local obligations can ever be rec-
onciled. He argues that Coleman and Harding's defense of the 
right to membership "fails to capture our ambivalence about the 
duties we may owe to persons outside our own political commu-
nity." (p. 136) 
By addressing the question of what limits on immigration 
are permissible in a liberal democracy, these essays shed light on 
parallel topics in constitutional immigration law. One parallel 
concerns the plenary power doctrine itself. The idea that we owe 
duties to those outside our political community is highly relevant 
to one criticism of the plenary power doctrine. Without such du-
ties, there is one less reason for constitutional judicial review and 
one more reason for plenary power. After all, the plenary power 
doctrine derives much of its justification from the view that rights 
are only for members, and hence that the Constitution has no 
application to immigration decisions. The relevance of these es-
says to plenary power goes one important step further. Skepti-
cism about the nation-state itself and about national borders 
forces us to think beyond the "national imagination" in which 
386 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:378 
much legal and political discourse about immigration takes 
place.21 
Here is another parallel: the discussions of ethnicity-based, 
or race-based conceptions of membership are helpful in under-
standing the role of race and national origin in United States im-
migration law.n The parallel in constitutional immigration law 
lies in the nondiscrimination norm in our constitutional culture 
generally, and its statutory expression in immigration law in the 
1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act.23 
Pertinent here is Hampton's caution that her "argument against 
nation-states is not an argument against the importance of a cul-
tural community, but it is an argument against the idea that cul-
tural and political communities should always-or even 
usually-overlap." (p. 87-88) Perry makes a related point: it is 
the character of culture that counts, not its substance. A liberal 
democracy may restrict membership to maintain some culture, 
but not to maintain a particular culture, for example with a cer-
tain racial or ethnic composition. Thus Perry writes: "a liberal 
state always contains the seeds of a pluralist society." (p. 120) 
And Tushnet writes: "Membership in some community is morally 
valuable. Membership in a community constituted in a particular 
way is not." (p. 155) 
C. WHOSE JUSTICE, WHOSE WELFARE? 
The book asks a third key question with a important parallel 
in constitutional immigration law: whose "justice" or "welfare" 
matters? To the extent that this question poses a choice between 
members and outsiders, a number of the essays address it as part 
of their analysis of permissible limits on immigration. But to the 
extent that the choice is between members competing for influ-
ence over immigration policy, the book devotes relatively little 
analysis. 
The one exception is Gillian Hadfield, who writes: "At first 
the normative question raised with respect to immigration law 
appears to be, Who should we let in? But if we press on this 
characterization of the issue, I think we will see that it begs a 
21. See Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the 
National Imagination, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 555, 570-71, 585-90, 598-600 (1996). See also 
sources cited id. at 604 n.119. 
22. See Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Im-
migration Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1927, 1938-52 (1996) ("Two Models"); Stephen H. 
Legornsky, Immigration, Equality, and Diversity, 31 Colum. J. Transnat'l. L. 319 (1993). 
23. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 
Stat. 911. See generally Two Models at 1932-38 (cited in note 22). 
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deeper question: Who are 'we'?" (p. 204) She elaborates: 
"[i]mmigration policy, the existence of borders that mark some 
as insiders and others as outsiders, is logically prior to the norma-
tive defense of conventional welfare analysis." (p. 204) Thus, "a 
social welfare function that reflects the well-being of men alone 
or current workers alone is to assume away the ethical issues 
raised." (p. 205) From this Hadfield concludes: "a social welfare 
function that focuses exclusively on the impact of immigration on 
current residents cannot be the basis for the economist's partici-
pation in a normative debate on immigration." (p. 205) Her so-
lution is a "global social welfare" perspective. Whether or not 
this is persuasive, Hadfield's essay helpfully raises the problem of 
the perspective from which the "we" is defined. 
Here the constitutional parallel is this question: with whose 
rights should lawmakers be concerned? Constitutional immigra-
tion law needs to pay more attention to this issue. The tradi-
tional view in constitutional immigration law is that the plenary 
power doctrine stands opposed to the recognition of immigrants' 
rights. Another view, which deserves further development by 
judges, advocates, and scholars, is that the rights of members to 
confer membership on outsiders is not necessarily a power exer-
cised by the state, and that the process of conferring membership 
is more pluralistic than in commonly recognized. The complexi-
ties of this process should be taken much more seriously than 
they have been historically.z4 
III 
Beyond contributing with regard to these three questions 
with parallels in constitutional immigration law, the book high-
lights some aspects of immigration law and policy that are easy to 
forget. A doctrinal approach to immigration law and policy 
tends to overlook the fact that immigration is just one way to 
transfer resources across borders, and that redrawing of borders, 
trade, and foreign aid are alternatives. We might also consider 
forms of direct action besides foreign aid, for example military 
intervention. Perry makes these links explicit. (p. 103) Sykes 
points out that some of the costs associated with immigration are 
not costs of immigration at all, but rather costs of entitlement 
programs and other public benefits open to immigrants. (p. 176) 
Susan Vroman is right that Sykes' argument in favor of immigra-
24. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, 
and the Constitution, 97 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997); Two Models at 1942-45 (cited 
in note 22); Motomura, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. at 201-16 (cited in note 18). 
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tion is "quite similar to the argument used in favor of free inter-
national trade." (p. 212) And as previously mentioned, several 
authors raise basic questions about viewing immigration from a 
perspective that assumes the legitimacy of the nation-state or of 
states and borders generally. 
The questions raised in this volume are sometimes more in-
teresting and helpful than the answers that the authors propose. 
For example, several essays discuss the obligations owed to "ref-
ugees." Coleman and Harding conclude that "all refugees have a 
right to immigrate." (p. 52) But who is a "refugee"? The 
problems of refugee and asylum policy would be less intractable 
if we could always ascertain who they are. Often lacking is an 
awareness of the problems of procedure, as matters of both ad-
ministration and due process. Similarly, the book devotes con-
siderable analysis to whether immigrants contribute to the 
American economy. To be sure, the answer affects virtually all 
immigration choices. But economic analysis is only the begin-
ning of inquiry. Typical legislative choices do not concern immi-
gration per se but rather narrower choices about specific 
categories. Even Tushnet hedges his conclusion: "As a matter of 
principle, liberals ought to be committed to relatively un-
restricted immigration policies." (p. 155, emphasis added) In the 
end, what does "relatively" mean? Isn't defining "relatively" the 
whole game? 
The idea that there are fundamental norms-whether they 
are styled "liberal democratic principles" or "constitutional im-
migration law"-that guide and limit immigration law is key to 
its sound and coherent future development. The book's claim in 
the front matter to be the "first interdisciplinary study" of the 
subject is overstated.2s But we do need more of them. 
25. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 89-95 (Yale U. 
Press, 1980); Yasemin Nuholu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe (U. of Chicago Press, 1994); Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense 
of Pluralism and Equality at 31-62 (cited in note 20); Mark Gibney, ed., Open Borders? 
Closed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues (Greenwood Press, 1988); William Rod-
gers Brubaker, ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North 
America (U. Press of America, 1989); Symposium: Law and Community, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 
1373 (1986); Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 
237 (1994); Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship, 35 Va. J. lnt'l L. 279 (1994); David A. 
Martin, The Civic Republican Ideal for Citizenship and for Our Common Life, 35 Va. J. 
Int'l L. 301 (1994); and Peter H. Schuck, Whose Membership Is It, Anyway? Comments on 
Gerald Neuman, 35 Va. J. lnt'l L. 321 (1994). 
